# Doubles---UK 21

## 1NC

### Off

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#### Interpretation---the resolution should define the division of Aff and Neg ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### The USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that expands the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1. Fairness---the Neg should win on average 50% of the time---any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose---their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Clash---debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third- and fourth-line responses---that’s key to effective politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs---their interpretation explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

### Off

PIC

#### We endorse the Aff’s model of militant education without surrendering to blackness.

#### Calls for surrender lead to elite capture---that turns the case

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do or do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail.

The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces.

Some rooms have outsize power and influence: the Situation Room, the newsroom, the bargaining table, the conference room. Being in these rooms means being in a position to affect institutions and broader social dynamics by way of deciding what one is to say and do. Access to these rooms is itself a kind of social advantage, and one often gained through some prior social advantage. From a societal standpoint, the “most affected” by the social injustices we associate with politically important identities like gender, class, race, and nationality are disproportionately likely to be incarcerated, underemployed, or part of the 44 percent of the world’s population without internet access – and thus both left out of the rooms of power and largely ignored by the people in the rooms of power. Individuals who make it past the various social selection pressures that filter out those social identities associated with these negative outcomes are most likely to be in the room. That is, they are most likely to be in the room precisely because of ways in which they are systematically different from (and thus potentially unrepresentative of) the very people they are then asked to represent in the room.

I suspected that Helen’s offer was a trap. She was not the one who set it, but it threatened to ensnare us both all the same. Broader cultural norms – the sort set in motion by prefacing statements with “As a Black man…” – cued up a set of standpoint-respecting practices that many of us know consciously or unconsciously by rote. However, the forms of deference that often follow are ultimately self-undermining and only reliably serve “elite capture”: the control over political agendas and resources by a group’s most advantaged people. If we want to use standpoint epistemology to challenge unjust power arrangements, it’s hard to imagine how we could do worse.

To say what’s wrong with the popular, deferential applications of standpoint epistemology, we need to understand what makes it popular. A number of cynical answers present themselves: some (especially the more socially advantaged) don’t genuinely want social change – they just want the appearance of it. Alternatively, deference to figures from oppressed communities is a performance that sanitizes, apologizes for, or simply distracts from the fact that the deferrer has enough “in the room” privilege for their “lifting up” of a perspective to be of consequence.

I suspect there is some truth to these views, but I am unsatisfied. Many of the people who support and enact these deferential norms are rather like Helen: motivated by the right reasons, but trusting people they share such rooms with to help them find the proper practical expression of their joint moral commitments. We don’t need to attribute bad faith to all or even most of those who interpret standpoint epistemology deferentially to explain the phenomenon, and it’s not even clear it would help. Bad “roommates” aren’t the problem for the same reason that Helen being a good roommate wasn’t the solution: the problem emerges from how the rooms themselves are constructed and managed.

To return to the initial example with Helen, the issue wasn’t merely that I hadn’t grown up in the kind of low-income, redlined community she was imagining. The epistemic situation was much worse than this. Many of the facts about me that made my life chances different from those of the people she was imagining were the very same facts that made me likely to be offered things on their behalf. If I had grown up in such a community, we probably wouldn’t have been on the phone together.

Many aspects of our social system serve as filtering mechanisms, determining which interactions happen and between whom, and thus which social patterns people are in a position to observe. For the majority of the 20th century, the U.S. quota system of immigration made legal immigration with a path to citizenship almost exclusively available to Europeans (earning Hitler’s regard as the obvious “leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration”). But the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act opened up immigration possibilities, with a preference for “skilled labour”.

My parents’ qualification as skilled labourers does much to explain their entry into the country and the subsequent class advantages and monetary resources (such as wealth) that I was born into. We are not atypical: the Nigerian-American population is one of the country’s most successful immigrant populations (what no one mentions, of course, is that the 112,000 or so Nigerian-Americans with advanced degrees is utterly dwarfed by the 82 million Nigerians who live on less than a dollar a day, or how the former fact intersects with the latter). The selectivity of immigration law helps explain the rates of educational attainment of the Nigerian diasporic community that raised me, which in turn helps explain my entry into the exclusive Advanced Placement and Honours classes in high school, which in turn helps explain my access to higher education...and so on, and so on.

It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes.

​But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted.

But these are the last facts we should want to hold fixed. Doing better than the epistemic norms we’ve inherited from a history of explicit global apartheid is an awfully low bar to set. The facts that explain who ends up in which room shape our world much more powerfully than the squabbles for comparative prestige between people who have already made it into the rooms. And when the conversation is about social justice, the mechanisms of the social system that determine who gets into which room often just are the parts of society we aim to address. For example, the fact that incarcerated people cannot participate in academic discussions about freedom that physically take place on campus is intimately related to the fact that they are locked in cages.

Deference epistemology marks itself as a solution to an epistemic and political problem. But not only does it fail to solve these problems, it adds new ones. One might think questions of justice ought to be primarily concerned with fixing disparities around health care, working conditions, and basic material and interpersonal security. Yet conversations about justice have come to be shaped by people who have ever more specific practical advice about fixing the distribution of attention and conversational power. Deference practices that serve attention-focused campaigns (e.g. we’ve read too many white men, let’s now read some people of colour) can fail on their own highly questionable terms: attention to spokespeople from marginalized groups could, for example, direct attention away from the need to change the social system that marginalizes them.

Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy.

Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside.

But probably not.

A fuller and fairer assessment of what is going on with deference and standpoint epistemology would go beyond technical argument, and contend with the emotional appeals of this strategy of deference. Those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in. After all, a person privileged in an absolute sense (a person belonging to, say, the half of the world that has secure access to “basic needs”) may nevertheless feel themselves to be consistently on the low end of the power dynamics they actually experience. Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect.

The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology – its recognition of the importance of perspective – becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents “centring” or even hearing from the most marginalized; it focuses us on the interaction of the rooms we occupy, rather than calling us to account for the interactions we don’t experience. This fact about who is in the room, combined with the fact that speaking for others generates its own set of important problems (particularly when they are not there to advocate for themselves), eliminates pressures that might otherwise trouble the centrality of our own suffering – and of the suffering of the marginalized people that do happen to make it into rooms with us.

The dangers with this feature of deference politics are grave, as are the risks for those outside of the most powerful rooms. For those who are deferred to, it can supercharge group-undermining norms. In Conflict is Not Abuse, Sarah Schulman makes a provocative observation about the psychological effects of both trauma and felt superiority: while these often come about for different reasons and have very different moral statuses, they result in similar behavioural patterns. Chief among these are misrepresenting the stakes of conflict (often by overstating harm) or representing others’ independence as a hostile threat (such as failures to “centre” the right topics or people). These behaviours, whatever their causal history, have corrosive effects on individuals who perform them as well as the groups around them, especially when a community’s norms magnify or multiply these behaviours rather than constraining or metabolizing them.

For those who defer, the habit can supercharge moral cowardice. The norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility: it displaces onto individual heroes, a hero class, or a mythicized past the work that is ours to do now in the present. Their perspective may be clearer on this or that specific matter, but their overall point of view isn’t any less particular or constrained by history than ours. More importantly, deference places the accountability that is all of ours to bear onto select people – and, more often than not, a hyper-sanitized and thoroughly fictional caricature of them.

The same tactics of deference that insulate us from criticism also insulate us from connection and transformation. They prevent us from engaging empathetically and authentically with the struggles of other people – prerequisites of coalitional politics. As identities become more and more fine-grained and disagreements sharper, we come to realize that “coalitional politics” (understood as struggle across difference) is, simply, politics. Thus, the deferential orientation, like that fragmentation of political collectivity it enables, is ultimately anti-political.

Deference rather than interdependence may soothe short-term psychological wounds. But it does so at a steep cost: it can undermine the epistemic goals that motivate the project, and it entrenches a politics unbefitting of anyone fighting for freedom rather than for privilege, for collective liberation rather than mere parochial advantage.

How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have.

The water crisis in Flint, Michigan presents a clear example of both the possibilities and limitations of refining our epistemic politics in this way. Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), a government body tasked with the support of “healthy communities”, with a team of fifty trained scientists at its disposal, was complicit in covering up the scale and gravity of the public health crisis from the beginning of the crisis in 2014 until it garnered national attention in 2015.

The MDEQ, speaking from a position of epistemic and political authority, defended the status quo in Flint. They claimed that “Flint water is safe to drink”, and were cited in Flint Mayor Dayne Walling’s statement aiming to “dispel myths and promote the truth about the Flint River” during the April 2014 transition to the Flint River water source. That transition was spearheaded under the tenure of the city’s emergency manager Darnell Earley (an African-American, like many of the city residents he helped to poison). After the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) circulated a leaked internal memo from the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in July of 2014 expressing concern about lead in Flint water, the MDEQ produced a doctored report that put the overall measure of lead levels within federally mandated levels by mysteriously failing to count two contaminated samples.

The reaction from residents was immediate. The month after the switch in water source, residents reported that their tap water was discoloured and gave off an alarming odour. They didn’t need their oppression to be “celebrated”, “centred”, or narrated in the newest academic parlance. They didn’t need someone to understand what it felt like to be poisoned. What they needed was the lead out of their water. So they got to work.

The first step was to develop epistemic authority. To achieve this they built a new room: one that put Flint residents and activists in active collaboration with scientists who had the laboratories that could run the relevant tests and prove the MDEQ’s report to be fraudulent. Flint residents’ outcry recruited scientists to their cause and led a “citizen science” campaign, further raising the alarm about the water quality and distributing sample kits to neighbours to submit for testing. In this stage, the alliance of residents and scientists won, and the poisoning of the children of Flint emerged as a national scandal.

But this was not enough. The second step – cleaning the water – required more than state acknowledgement: it required apportioning labour and resources to fix the water and address the continuing health concerns. What Flint residents received, initially, was a mix of platitudes and mockery from the ruling elite (some of this personally committed by a President that shared a racial identity with many of them). This year, however, it looks as though the tireless activism of Flint residents and their expanding list of teammates has won additional and more meaningful victories: the ongoing campaign is pushing the replacements of the problematic service lines to their final stage and is forcing the state of Michigan to agree to a settlement of $600 million for affected families.

This outcome is in no way a wholesale victory: not only will attorney fees cut a substantial portion of payouts, but the settlement cannot undo the damage that was caused to the residents. A constructive epistemology cannot guarantee full victory over an oppressive system by itself. No epistemic orientation can by itself undo the various power asymmetries between the people and the imperial state system. But it can help make the game a little more competitive – and deference epistemology isn’t even playing.

The biggest threats to social justice attention and informational economies are not the absence of yet more jargon to describe, ever more precisely or incisively, the epistemic, attentional, or interpersonal afflictions of the disempowered. The biggest threats are the erosion of the practical and material bases for popular power over knowledge production and distribution, particularly that which could aid effective political action and constrain or eliminate predation by elites. The capture and corruption of these bases by well-positioned elites, especially tech corporations, goes on unabated and largely unchallenged, including: the corporate monopolization of local news, the ongoing destruction and looting of the journalistic profession, the interference of corporations and governments in key democratic processes, and the domination of elite interests in the production of knowledge by research universities and the circulation of the output of these distorted processes by established media organizations.

Confronting these threats requires leaving some rooms – and building new ones.

The constructive approach to standpoint epistemology is demanding. It asks that we swim upstream: to be accountable and responsive to people who aren’t yet in the room, to build the kinds of rooms we could sit in together, rather than merely judiciously navigating the rooms history has built for us. But this weighty demand is par for the course when it comes to the politics of knowledge: the American philosopher Sandra Harding famously pointed out that standpoint epistemology, properly understood, demands more rigour from science and knowledge production processes generally, not less.

But one important topic stands unaddressed. The deferential approach to standpoint epistemology often comes packaged with concern and attention to the importance of lived experience. Among these, traumatic experiences are especially foregrounded.

At this juncture, scholarly analysis and argument fail me. The remainder of what I have to say skews more towards conviction than contention. But the life of books has taught me that conviction has just as much to teach, however differently posed or processed, and so I press on.

I take concerns about trauma especially seriously. I grew up in the United States, a nation structured by settler colonialism, racial slavery, and their aftermath, with enough collective and historical trauma to go round. I also grew up in a Nigerian diasporic community, populated by many who had genocide in living memory. At the national and community level, I have seen a lot of traits of norms, personality, quirks of habit and action that I’ve suspected were downstream of these facts. At the level of individual experience, I’ve watched and felt myself change in reaction to fearing for my dignity or life, to crushing pain and humiliation. I reflect on these traumatic moments often, and very seldom think: “That was educational”.

These experiences can be, if we are very fortunate, building blocks. What comes of them depends on how the blocks are put together: what standpoint epistemologists call the “achievement thesis”. Briana Toole clarifies that, by itself, one’s social location only puts a person in a position to know. “Epistemic privilege” or advantage is achieved only through deliberate, concerted struggle from that position.

I concede outright that this is certainly one possible result of the experience of oppression: have no doubt that humiliation, deprivation, and suffering can build (especially in the context of the deliberate, structured effort of “consciousness raising”, as Toole specifically highlights). But these same experiences can also destroy, and if I had to bet on which effect would win most often, it would be the latter. As Agnes Callard rightly notes, trauma (and even the righteous, well-deserved anger that often accompanies it) can corrupt as readily as it can ennoble. Perhaps more so.

Contra the old expression, pain – whether borne of oppression or not – is a poor teacher. Suffering is partial, short-sighted, and self-absorbed. We shouldn’t have a politics that expects different: oppression is not a prep school.

When it comes down to it, the thing I believe most deeply about deference epistemology is that it asks something of trauma that it cannot give. Demanding as the constructive approach may be, the deferential approach is far more demanding and in a far more unfair way: it asks the traumatized to shoulder burdens alone that we ought to share collectively. When I think about my trauma, I don’t think about grand lessons. I think about the quiet nobility of survival. The very fact that those chapters weren’t the final ones of my story is powerful enough writing all on its own. It is enough to ask of those experiences that I am still here to remember them.

Deference epistemology asks us to be less than we are – and not even for our own benefit. As Nick Estes explains in the context of Indigenous politics: “The cunning of trauma politics is that it turns actual people and struggles, whether racial or Indigenous citizenship and belonging, into matters of injury. It defines an entire people mostly on their trauma and not by their aspirations or sheer humanity”. This performance is not for the benefit of Indigenous people, but “for white audiences or institutions of power”.

I also think about James Baldwin’s realization that the things that tormented him the most were “the very things that connected me with all the people who were alive, who had ever been alive”. That I have survived abuse of various kinds, have faced near-death from both accidental circumstance and violence (different as the particulars of these may be from those around me) is not a card to play in gamified social interaction or a weapon to wield in battles over prestige. It is not what gives me a special right to speak, to evaluate, or to decide for a group. It is a concrete, experiential manifestation of the vulnerability that connects me to most of the people on this Earth. It comes between me and other people not as a wall, but as a bridge.

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#### Big Tech rising now---contained antitrust is key.

Rob Lever 8-15. Writer at TechXPlore. Big Tech rolls on as investors shrug off regulatory pressure. No Publication. 8-15-2021. https://techxplore.com/news/2021-08-big-tech-investors-regulatory-pressure.html

Pressure is rising on Big Tech firms, signaling tougher regulation in Washington and elsewhere that could lead to the breakup of the largest platforms. But you'd hardly know by looking at their share prices.

Shares in Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Google parent Alphabet have hovered near record highs in recent weeks, lifted by pandemic-fueled surges in sales and profits that have helped the big firms extend their dominance of key economic sectors.

The Biden administration has given signs of more aggressive regulation with appointments of Big Tech critics at the Federal Trade Commission.

But that has failed to dent the momentum of the largest tech firms, despite tough talk and antitrust litigation in the United States and Europe, with US lawmakers eyeing moves to make antitrust enforcement easier.

Big Tech critics in the United States and the EU want Apple and Google to loosen the grip of their online app marketplaces; more competition in a digital advertising market dominated by Google and Facebook; and better access to Amazon's e-commerce platform by third-party sellers.

One lawsuit tossed out by a judge but in the process of being refiled could force Facebook to spin off its Instagram and WhatsApp platforms, and some activists and lawmakers are pressing for breakups of the four tech giants.

All four have hit market valuations above $1 trillion, with Apple over $2 trillion. Alphabet shares are up some 80 percent from a year ago, with Facebook up nearly 40 percent and Apple almost 30 percent. Amazon shares are roughly on par with last year's level after breaking records in July.

Microsoft, with a $2 trillion valuation, has largely escaped antitrust scrutiny, even as it has benefitted from the cloud computing trend.

The surging growth has stoked complaints that the strongest firms are extending their dominance and squeezing out rivals.

Yet analysts say any aggressive actions, in the legal or legislative arena, could take years to play out and face challenges.

Fast-moving environment

"Breakup is going to be nearly impossible," said analyst Daniel Newman at Futurum Research, citing the need for controversial legislative changes to antitrust laws.

Newman said a more likely outcome would be multibillion-dollar fines that the companies could easily absorb as they adjust their business models to adapt to problematic issues in a fast-moving environment.

"These companies have more resources and know-how than the regulators," he said.

Dan Ives at Wedbush Securities said any antitrust action would likely require legislative change—unlikely with a divided Congress.

"Until investors start to see some consensus on where the regulatory and law changes go from an antitrust perspective, it's a contained risk, and they see a green light to buy tech," he said.

#### Expanded antitrust causes a wave of additional expansions---tanks current Big Tech innovation and economic output.

Wayne Brough 6-15. Policy Director at R-Street, Technology & Innovation. Washington wants to weaponize antitrust law to attack “Big Tech” and it is going to backfire horribly. R Street. 6-15-2021. https://www.rstreet.org/2021/06/15/washington-wants-to-weaponize-antitrust-law-to-attack-big-tech-and-it-is-going-to-backfire-horribly/

Solutions in Search of a Problem

As with many other regulatory incursions into the digital world, the renewed push for tougher antitrust laws is a solution in search of a problem. Both Republican and Democratic criticisms of Big Tech raise a litany of issues—from an anti-conservative bias to fake news and hate speech—none of which fall within the purview of antitrust law and anticompetitive behavior. Instead, the new regulatory regime under consideration is a punitive and political attack on politically disfavored corporations. Ultimately, that is the larger battle—abandoning the consumer welfare standard and its focus on demonstrable consumer harm in favor of a politicized regime that allows those in Congress greater control over private companies.

And while tech companies may be the exclusive focus of the current reforms, the scope of the proposed legislation could easily be expanded by a future Congress. Even today, many lawmakers are openly hostile toward a growing list of American businesses. Republicans have been vocal in calling for retaliatory measures against “woke” corporations deemed too progressive in their public stances. If policymakers continue to abandon economic principles, it would not be surprising to see calls for additional antitrust enforcement for any company that makes political waves.

Prior to the adoption of the consumer welfare standard almost 50 years ago, antitrust law was often confusing, economically suspect and even contradictory. In one notorious case, the Supreme Court blocked a merger where the merged company would have had a market share of merely 7.5 percent—hardly an example of market dominance. And economists examining antitrust enforcement prior to the consumer welfare standard found no correlation between antitrust enforcement and a reduction in the welfare losses from monopoly. Further research found congressional influence to be a better predictor of enforcement activity.

The consumer welfare standard helped rationalize antitrust enforcement and the case law that has emerged since its adoption has helped curb the political abuse of antitrust policies. Abandoning the need to identify demonstrable consumer harm would return antitrust law to an era characterized by arbitrary enforcement actions that many in today’s Congress seem to have forgotten. But the increased political oversight that comes with adopting more aggressive tools for antitrust enforcement poses a real threat to consumers, to innovation and to economic growth.

Abandoning the American Way in Favor of a European One

The bills introduced in the House can be interpreted as a turn toward a European approach to competition policy. Last year, the EU passed the Digital Markets Act, and the House proposals sound eerily similar. The EU started by defining “gatekeepers,” something similar to the “covered platforms” in the House bills. Restrictions on self-preferencing, interoperability requirements and other elements introduced in the House all have direct counterparts in the EU’s law.

The EU adopted its laws with a clear target in mind—American tech companies that were dominating markets in Europe and outperforming their European rivals. Politically, it made sense to rewrite the rules of the game in favor of homegrown talent. Among other things, this meant the EU could collect billion-dollar fines from American companies, all in the name of “fair competition.”

But the performance of European companies is probably the best reason not to follow the EU’s lead in redefining how we regulate competition. By virtually every measure, U.S. companies have been more innovative, more dynamic and more profitable than their European counterparts. There are more start-ups in the United States and they have greater access to capital. While the United States and the EU have economies of similar magnitudes, in 2019, U.S. startups had a valuation of $1.37 trillion compared to EU startups with an evaluation of $240 billion.

The rise of Silicon Valley is an American success story. Today the top five companies in the United States based on market capitalization are tech companies. They have led the digital revolution, providing consumers a virtually endless stream of new products at low or even zero cost in many cases. These are signs of a robust market that serves consumers well. It is important to remember that big does not equate to bad—sometimes a firm is large because it is efficient at serving its customers what they want. The tech sector supports 12 million jobs and more than $2 trillion in economic output. Current antitrust laws grounded in the consumer welfare standard are part of the institutional framework that make this possible. Congress should ensure antitrust laws fit best into the modern U.S. economy, but the House proposals are a radical departure that shifts the focus to protecting competitors rather than consumers. They would weaponize antitrust law, provide politicians a greater say in America’s boardrooms and replace economic efficiency with political expediency and preference.

#### Big Tech drives AI innovation and R&D investments---antitrust fractures it.

Nicole Hemsoth 20. Co-Founder and Co-Editor at the Next Platform. What Could Stifle American AI Innovation?. Next Platform. 5-21-2020. https://www.nextplatform.com/2020/05/21/what-could-stifle-american-ai-innovation/

There are many things the U.S. government can do, but innovating at a rapid pace in the ever-evolving world of artificial intelligence is not necessarily one of them.

Much of the work in deep learning hardware and software comes from the private sector, which various government agencies depend upon for their various directives. However, we are in an age of complicated antitrust conversations and unfortunately, many of the companies under the gun for such action are those who supply the feds with much-needed computational and algorithmic know-how and tools.

The Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) issued a detailed brief this month reviewing the role of antitrust action and what it could mean for the Pentagon’s access to AI. Indeed, there are a number of other government entities that could feel the burn if some of the most prolific tech monopolies are divvied up, but the report is narrowly focused on the Pentagon specifically.

We talked with one of the authors of the report, Dakota Foster, a visiting researcher at CSET about the multi-layered question of antitrust, AI, and what governments stand to lose (and what smaller private companies and startups might gain).

One of the most interesting questions in the wake of potential antitrust action against some of the largest tech companies (Google Microsoft, etc.) is around innovation. How might it might stifled and what will the effect be on the agencies that rely on the swift pace of progress on strategically critical technology areas like AI?

“We estimate that antitrust action will likely reduce the net amount and diversity of data held by firms that are broken up and could also reduce firms’ R&D budgets,” Foster says. “However, the effect these losses will have on innovation remains unclear. Similarly, we expect firms’ computing resources to diminish with yet undetermined consequences; shared compute resources could perhaps more than compensate for any loss.”

The R&D problem of any potential antitrust action down the pike would be most keenly felt in R&D, which spurs the innovation of many of the platforms that have tricked into use in hyperscale, HPC, and enterprise settings as open source or simply inspiration. While plenty of work comes out of national lab and developer communities, few things can beat a near-limitless well of R&D funds to innovative and iterate.

Foster and colleagues argue that If “R&D spending drives innovation, firms that can spend more on R&D— presumably large ones—will generally hold an edge in innovation.” They add that a “postbreakup AI sector could be less innovative as a result. Large tech companies do in fact spend more on R&D both in absolute and relative terms. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, in absolute terms, Amazon and Alphabet were the world’s top two corporate R&D spenders in 2018, with Samsung, Intel, Microsoft and Apple in the top ten.

“The debate over breaking up Big Tech has profound national security implications. The Pentagon maintains that the innovation and acquisition of AI technologies is critical to America’s national security. Defense Secretary Mark Esper recently called AI the most significant emerging technology for warfare, predicting that “whoever masters it first will dominate on the battlefield for many, many, many years.” Although others within and beyond the Pentagon stress the limits of AI, its potential is widely acknowledged. In order to develop and deploy new, strategically decisive AI tools, the Pentagon must rely on an AI innovation ecosystem in which large private-sector companies play a critical role. At the same time, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, Congress, and state attorneys general have targeted many of the private sector’s largest and most innovative AI companies in ongoing antitrust probes.” – Dakota Foster, Visiting Researcher, CSET

#### Solves Bio-D loss and conservation---extinction.

Naveen Joshi 20. Tech Expert and CEO of Allerin with 20+ years of experience in Information Technology. Conserving Biodiversity with AI. BBN Times. 10-8-2020. https://www.bbntimes.com/technology/conserving-biodiversity-with-ai

The use of AI for biodiversity conservation can help prevent the extinction of plants and animals and thus maintain a stable ecosystem.

The extinction of plants and animals such as Rhynia, Pluchea Glutinosa, Dodo, Great Auk, Tasmanian Tiger, and Western Black Rhinoceros in recent years is a matter of great concern since it adversely affects our ecosystem. Every species of plants and animals is important. Why? The existence of both plants and animals has always been vital to humans. Extinction of organisms disrupts the food chain and hence affects the ecosystem. Therefore, humans are very much dependent on plants and animals for survival. Hence precautionary measures should be taken to maintain the stability of the ecosystem. The traditional biodiversity conservation methods have not shown much impact lately. Thus, the use of technology such as ML or AI for biodiversity conservation can help prevent further extinction of plants and animals.

Using AI for Biodiversity Conservation

The use of AI can help prevent the extinction of endangered plants and animals. Let's see how AI can be used for biodiversity conservation:

AI for Animal Conservation

With the recent development of AI-powered devices for the conservation of animals, we can now prevent wildlife extinction. After the extinction of western African rhinoceros, African elephants are next on the verge of going extinct due to the involvement of extensive poaching. According to a report by HuffPost, African elephants may be extinct by the year 2020. Due to this reason, an American multinational corporation and technology company has taken a step forward to stop poachers attack African elephants. The company has come with an AI-based technology security system that promotes anti-poaching. The AI-based technology system uses a camera that detects poachers planning to attack an animal and subsequently generates an alert to the park rangers in real time. According to the Wild Heart Wildlife Foundation, one elephant is killed every 15 minutes due to illegal hunting. Hence, this AI-based system can prevent illegal hunting of animals to a great extent. The AI-based system uses a vision processor with neural network algorithms to detects an object and classify images inside the camera. According to the company that has invested in this technology the AI-based system has helped cut down poaching at Serengeti National Park in Africa. The AI-based system has detected members from over 20 different poaching gangs within the first 15 months of its installation. Similarly, a number of such AI-based devices are manufactured by technology companies that can greatly help in animal conservation.

AI for Plant Conservation

Plants are very beneficial for human lives and greatly help in fulfilling our necessities. They help fulfill our basic necessities as they can provide us with food, shelter, and medicine. The more the number of trees present in an environment, the greater is the amount of oxygen produced. Hence, plants greatly help in maintaining the stability of the ecosystem. Based on a report by Mongabay, according to scientists, one in every five plant species are on the verge of being extinct. This clearly implies how important it is to conserve plants.

The California Academy of Sciences and National Geographic Society have jointly developed an AI-based networking platform that can help in the conservation of plants globally. The AI-based platform allows its users to click and share photos of various species of plants in real time. It also allows the other community members to identify the photos of the specific plant and confirm the plant's presence, whether if such a plant already exists. In this way, the AI-based networking platform can help discover new species of plants worldwide. This technology has proved to be a sigh of relief for scientists. It used to take hundreds of years by scientists for the collection of data about various types of plants and their existence. Now, with the help of this AI-based platform, scientists can collect data much effectively and on a large scale, and thus they can suggest measures to prevent the extinction of plants.

### Case---1NC

#### Vote Neg on presumption---their method does nothing to change dominant discourses or structures that perpetuate violence. Their challenge to this has no means of spilling outside of debate, which is necessary for them to solve any of their impacts---their belief that it does is cruel optimism, which turns case.

#### Ballots as validating are bad.

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

#### Cap is not monolithic---view it as contestable.

Kirsten BELL AND GREEN 16, Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia; AND Judith GREEN, Faculty of Public Health & Policy, Department of Health Services Research & Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, [“On the perils of invoking neoliberalism in public health critique,” *Critical Public Health*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2016, p. 239-243, Emory Libraries]

Indeed, Ward and England (2007) have identified four distinct understandings of neoliberalism in the social sciences: (1) neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project; (2) neoliberalism as policy and programme (e.g. policies enacted under the banner of privatization, deregulation, liberalization, etc.); (3) neoliberalism as state form – i.e. the ‘rolling back’ and ‘rolling out’ of state formations in the name of reform; and (4) neoliberalism as governmentality – the ways in which the relations among and between peoples and things are reimagined, reinterpreted and reassembled to effect governing at a distance.

In light of this eclectic usage, scholars are now examining the relationships between neoliberalism and everything from ‘cities to citizenship, sexuality to subjectivity, and development to discourse to name but a few’ (Springer, 2012, p. 135). Although these versions of neoliberalism often intersect with each other, they can also lead to very different readings of the same phenomena. For example, taking a political economy perspective, Otero, Pechlaner, Liberman, and Gürcan (2015, p. 48) use the term ‘neoliberal diet’ to characterize the high levels of consumption of energy-dense, low-nutrition ‘pseudo foods’ amongst the working class; however, Foucauldian governmentality perspectives are more likely to characterize a neoliberal diet as precisely the opposite of this – as one that encourages the individual to take responsibility for his or her health by consuming more fruits and vegetables (e.g. Ayo, 2012). When a concept can be used to describe such an extraordinary – and even downright contradictory – array of phenomena, questions can clearly be asked about how useful it actually is.

Perhaps a larger issue is the reductive ways neoliberalism often tends to be used. As Phelan (2007) observes, in a number of accounts its effects are so totalizing and monolithic that it starts to assume causal properties in its own right; ‘that is, it becomes the “it” which does the explaining, rather than the political phenomenon that needs to be explained’ (Phelan, 2007, p. 328). Consider, for example, neoliberalism as governmentality – one of the more common ways the term is employed by CPH authors. As Kipnis (2008) observes, the key defining features of this variant of neoliberalism: governing from a distance; the emphasis on calculability; and the promotion of self-activating, disciplined, individuated subjects, can be found in a variety of contexts that are historically and culturally distant from Western neoliberal or liberal governing philosophies. In his words, ‘These three categories correspond to broad human potentialities that have been imagined in a wide variety of ways in a broad range of settings and that have become more prevalent in all state-governed and industrial societies’ (p. 284, emphasis added). Thus, characterizing such features exclusively in terms of neoliberalism runs the risk of exaggerating its scope by reifying it into a globally dominant force or stage of history (Kipnis, 2008). It also runs the risk of eliding other processes that deserve analytic attention in their own right. For such reasons, there have been growing calls to explore neoliberalism in terms of ‘concrete projects that account for specific people, institutions and places’ (Kingfisher & Maskovsky, 2008, p. 118) – what Brenner and Theodore (2002) refer to as ‘actually existing neoliberalism’.

Some suggestions for the way forward

Theoretical concepts such as neoliberalism clearly have their uses: they signal to readers the kind of argument a writer is making, and act as a shorthand to summarize complex configurations of economic, political and cultural change that do, arguably, have some commonalities across different contexts. It is the role of theory to provide abstracted explanations that hold across time and place, and the concept of neoliberalism has been a fruitful one for thinking about some general implications of contemporary social change. However, over-extension has its risks, and there are now diminishing returns in simply documenting how technologies, policies or products ‘illustrate’ neoliberalism. To advance our understanding of how, specifically, public health is imbricated in the various manifestations of neoliberalism requires a more critical, nuanced and reflexive approach.

First, we need far more clarity on how the term is being used, rather than taking its meaning for granted. With the over-extension of ‘neoliberal’ to describe everything from welfare cuts to wearable health monitors, scholars need to unpack more carefully the particular processes to which they are referring. Rather than assume a deterministic role for those processes, the nature of the links between, say, welfare change and the impact on subjectivities needs to be explicated. As Meershoek and Hortsman (2016) note in this issue, merely reporting how health promotion reflects or contributes to neoliberalism does little to untangle the ‘material, technical and practical dimensions’ of how what kinds of health, and whose, are prioritized. Taking the commodification of workplace health promotion technologies as their case, they unpack how policies emphasizing employee health become legitimated within networks that include knowledge institutes and private companies, but not the workers themselves. Importantly, this focus on the process itself enables their analysis to point to not only the potential negative effects for public health of such commodification, but also ways forward, in political mobilization through workers’ organizations to incorporate different frameworks of well-being.

Second, we need more nuance and specificity in accounts. The question is not so much ‘what forms do public health outputs or technologies take in neoliberal times?’ but ‘how, where and in what forms do the various processes of neoliberalism impact public health?’ Two papers in this issue illustrate the value of more specificity. Hervik and Thurston (2016), in their account of how Norwegian men discuss their responsibilities for health, note that the specificities of the welfare state in Norway configure assumptions embedded in talk about ‘responsibility’. Rather than simply reading off the espousal of ‘personal responsibility for health’ as another reflection of neoliberal hegemony, Hervik and Thurston note that in this context, responsibility for health is rooted in a participatory model of the welfare state, in which principles of egalitarianism and social democracy may have very different implications for public health than in welfare states where the focus is on individual choice and self-sufficiency. Similarly, Nourpanah and Martin (2016) delineate both parallels and divergences between the discursive framings of health promotion described in Western states and those they document in Iran, where there is an absence of focus on consumption, despite similar orientations towards individual choice.

In general, rather than reifying neoliberalism as a monolithic entity, it may be more productive to speak of ‘neoliberalization’ as an always partial and incomplete process (Ward & England, 2007). This raises potentially fruitful questions around when, where, and in what ways the economic, political and cultural intersect with health. We need also to be reflexive about claims to neoliberalism, in that of course our critique is inevitably embroiled in the very processes it seeks to analyze. Indeed, it may be productive to think of neoliberalism as a discourse as much as a reality (Springer, 2012). In sum, we are not calling for the abandonment of the concept – paraphrasing Clifford (1988) on yet another troubled notion (‘culture’), neoliberalism seems to be a deeply compromised idea we cannot yet do without. Thus, being more careful and mindful of how we use it seems a good place to start.

#### Growth forces structural changes that solve environmental damage.

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Some seminal papers reveal that, within the process of economic growth, environmental pollution level first scales up and later scales down. This is an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and pollution level (Grossman and Krueger [3,4], Panayotou [5], Shafik [6], Selden and Song [7]). Since this relationship resembles the relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality produced by Kuznets [8], Panayotou [5] calls it Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).

According to the EKC hypothesis, the level of environmental pollution initially intensifies because of economic growth, later tampers after GDP per capita reaches a threshold value (Panayotou [5], Suri and Chapman [9]; Stern [10]). Therefore, this hypothesis implies a dynamic process in which structural change occurs together with economic growth (Dinda [2]). Grossman and Krueger [3] first clarify how the EKC arises. They explore that economic growth affects environmental quality through three channels: (i) scale effect, (ii) structural effect, and (iii) technological effect. Fig. 1 presents the EKC within the periods of (i), (ii) and (iii).

According to the scale effect, given the level of technology, more resources and inputs are employed to produce more commodities at the beginning of economic growth path. Hence, more energy resources and production will induce more waste and pollutant emissions, and the level of environmental quality will get worse (Torras and Boyce [11], Dinda [2], Prieur [12]). The structural effect states that the economy will have a structural transformation, and economic growth will affect environment positively along with continuation of growth. In other words, as national production grows the structure of economy changes, and the share of less polluting economic activities increases gradually. Besides, an economy experiences a transition from capital-intensive industrial sectors to service sector and reaches technology-intensive knowledge economy (the final stage of the structural change). Due to the fact that technology-intensive sectors utilize fewer natural sources, the impact of these sectors on environmental pollution will be less. The last channel of the growth process is the technological effect channel. Since a high-income economy can allocate more resources for research and development expenditures, the new technological processes will emerge. Thus, the country will replace old and dirty technologies with new and clean technologies, and environmental quality will deepen (Borghesi [13], Copelan and Taylor [14]). Consequently, environmental pollution initially increases and later decreases as a result of scale, structural and technological effect emerging along with growth path.

Some studies of EKC hypothesis consider income elasticity of clean environment demand (Beckerman [15], Selden and Song [16], McConnel [17], Panayotou [18], Carson et al. [19], Brock and Taylor [20]). Accordingly, the share of low-income people’s expenditures for food and basic necessities is higher than that of high-income societies’ expenditures for the same type of commodities (Engel’s Law). As income level and life standards rise in conjunction with economic growth, the societies’ demand for clean environment advances. Besides, societies make often pressure on policy makers to protect the environment through new regulations. One might argue that, because of these reasons, clean environment is a luxury commodity and the demand elasticity of clean environment is higher than unity (Dinda [2]).

#### The revolution fails---focus on the ethics of revolution destroys the chance for political success because elites block. Rejection of reformism for the sake of ethical purity results in the worst forms of apolitical moralism.

William CHALOUPKA 2, professor of political science at Colorado State University [“The Tragedy of the Ethical Commons: Demoralizing Environmentalism” in *The Politics of Moralizing*, ed. by Jane Bennett and Michael J. Shapiro, 2002, p. 124-125]

Environmentalism’s accidental and sedimentary way of accumulating a public strategy is not necessarily a problem in and of itself. We live in an apolitical culture, and many public concerns are handled as far away from politics as their advocates can manage. Political strategizing does not come easy for Americans, and it is thus avoided whenever possible. This is not necessarily a problem, in the grander scheme of things. But it does entail risks. And some of the risks hold special relevance for greens. While political culture depends on victories, for example, moralistic movements can learn to live quite well with defeat. Public setbacks are a matter of concern for the political activist, but could be reassuring for the moralist, who could see each setback as confirming the martyred cause. Left unwatched, such setbacks can become a trend, slipping over from martyrdom to pathos. Losing is bad. Winning is perilous. Losing with a sense of moral justification is terribly perilous. It can become habit or neurosis, damaging any chance for ultimate success.

There are other dangers inherent in the avoidance of the political when public concerns are at stake. If one always phrases one's political choices in terms of "the right thing," the risk is that political choices will be warped, at the same time that one is attempting to inoculate oneself from the worst of political culture. It is not an easy problem to avoid or solve. To put it another way, there is always the danger of learning to love the loss. Greens risk becoming comfortable with the arrangement in which any loss confirms one’s purity and correctness, one’s superiority to the political system that has delivered defeat. This is a durable problem. It reinforces itself, pushing the moralist out of politics or into failure. Even discussing the problem—recognizing its existence—requires a perspective at some distance from the ethical.

At the same time, it remains true that moralizing opens potentially political space, creating a constituency for public action and personal learning and change. But moralizing can also close off political options, through inattention or open critique of the inevitably messy, contingent, and compromised (and compromising) event that politics routinely becomes. The political world is durably contingent. What happens today is contingent on what happened yesterday. This is not to say, "anything goes," that one is somehow free to impose just anything on the political world. Quite the opposite: each political response is constrained by its provocation, while at the same time it attempts to rechannel subsequent debate. Contingency also implies the multidimensional quality of politics. Moralizing, economics, identity, history, and many other elements—some overlapping, some exclusive—can enter the fray, often unpredictably.

The contingency of politics is most troubling to those who are convinced that [END PAGE 124] politics has an underlying sense, a structure—whether that sense derives from the oppression of labor, women, or racial minorities; the progress of humanity; the exploitation of nature; or the automatic harmony between private and public goals, to cite just a few examples. The paired and primary lessons of political contingency are that luck can often intervene in the best-laid plans, but that such plans nonetheless must be made, as we struggle to accomplish public goals in a contingent context. The existence of a political space for environmental issues cannot be assumed. Such space is not guaranteed by the merit of green claims, and the same is true for everyone else's claims, too.

Environmental ethics can work against politics. From an ethical perspective, how could there be anything wrong with recycling? 18 It doesn't take much time, it provides a constant reminder of one's green commitments, and it provides the opportunity to educate children and friends about green goals. But from a political perspective, potential problems persist. Is there a danger that some citizens will come to believe that their civic responsibility has been discharged by recycling or green consumerism? 19 If one carefully buys the green product every time it is available, is there still a need to go to those tedious evening meetings, much less to run for office yourself? If one can act "directly" on a problem by recycling, what reason is there to spend time on such "indirect" activities as building coalitions with other groups? This kind of psychological compensation, in which desires are balanced (in these cases, at the expense of politics), is normal. But some kinds of activity are better equipped to address this dynamic than are others. And moralists, who stake so much on their moral certainty, are seldom known for their flexibility.

In extreme cases, the ethical (or ideological) denunciation has completely obscured or destroyed politics. Under the edict to only act in the interest of revolutionary change, twentieth-century Marxists insisted that "reformist" actions actually had an absolute and uniformly negative effect (a position, by the way, that Marx, a confirmed political enthusiast, likely would not have taken to such extremes). Only revolutionary politics was deemed to have any merit at all. Anything that could be described as reformist was removed from strategic consideration. Anything short of triumph is defeat. In other ways, the environmental movement has done remarkably well at distancing itself from Marxism, but in this case, the green habit tracks closely with the Marxist model. An excuse is provided, justifying the apolitical course that already has too much popular appeal. In short, the notion that ethics leads to politics is a dubious one. Sometimes this is true, but sometimes it isn't. And the strategic discussion about the effect of ethicizing public concerns is itself imperiled by excessive levels of ethical commitment, unless the ethicizers take precautions.

#### Progress within existing economic and social institutions is possible. Pure rejection without providing feasible alternatives to economic inequality locks the left into pessimism and social isolation.

Daniel INNERARITY 12, Chair in Social and Political Philosophy at Basque Country University [*The Future and Its Enemies: In Defense of Political Hope*, trans. by Sandra Kingery, 2012, p. 115-118]

One of the characters from Goethe's Torquato Tasso has given us a maxim that is probably the paradigm of all excuses: whatever one is/other people are to blame. This conviction does not clarify anything, but it provides a good deal of relief; its purpose is to reconfirm us as opposed to them. It explains in simple terms the tension between the global and the local, and it provides the basic outline for the relationship between right and left-wing forces. We can be certain that this approach encourages continued political confrontation when our entire view is filled with rhetoric designed to show that other people are worse than we are. This approach reveals very little confidence in our own project, ideas, and convictions.

This is, with few exceptions, how the current antagonism between the right and the left functions. That is why the many outstanding analyses about the problems of the New Right fail to mention the weaknesses of the left. What if we inverted the maxim spouted by Goethe's character and considered the ways in which the left is to blame for the right's successes? This type of analysis tends to be more productive because it would not have to buy into the prejudicial assumption that if our competitors are bad, then our ideas must necessarily be right. I believe that one of the main difficulties faced by the left in many countries of the world is that it limits itself to being the anti-right, which—although it may seem otherwise—has nothing to do with offering a true alternative. It has been said that the left has trouble mobilizing its electorate, and some believe that success would flow, not by reviving collective hope, but by fanning the flames of concern so that voters would be forced to support the left, however reluctantly, as the lesser evil.

To summarize, the right nowadays is optimistic and the left pessimistic. It may be the case that political enmity is currently articulated more as an emotional disposition than an ideological position. The truth of the matter is that emotions and ideas are more closely related than we tend to assume. If we look at things this way, we will perceive the ideological displacement that is taking place. Traditionally, the difference between progressives and conservatives corresponded with pessimism and optimism, both anthropologically and socially. While progressivism formed a part of a historic movement toward betterment, conservatism, as Ernst Bloch suggested, has always been prepared to accept the inevitability of a certain [END PAGE 115] amount of injustice or suffering. But to a large extent, this is no longer the case. The general mood of the right, whose best representative is Nicolas Sarkozy, is the complete opposite of resignation: decisive and active, complex-free, trusting in the future, and firmly resolved not to let anyonee, else take control of the vanguard. This attitude is making things difficult for a left that, even when it has good reasons to object, cannot seem to rally when the time comes for proposing something better. Whether defending the causes of marginalized peoples or becoming the advocate of pluralism, the left does not do so in order to construct an alternative conception of power; this is evidenced by the guilty conscience of those who realize they are merely preaching to the choir.

The left is, fundamentally, melancholic and critical. It sees the contemporary world as a machine that needs to be stopped, not as a source of opportunities and instruments susceptible to being placed at the service of its own values: justice and equality. Socialism is now perceived as the means to redress the inequalities of a liberal society. Its sole legitimacy stems from its goal of fixing things that were destroyed by the right or protecting things from the right's threats. It attempts to preserve that which is at risk of being destroyed but does not offer any alternative structure. Its restorative mentality is constructed at the expense of innovative and predictive thought. For this reason, it does not offer a coherent interpretation of the world that awaits us because that world is seen only as a potential threat. This suspicion of the future is basically the end result of perceiving the market and globalization as the principal agents of economic chaos and social inequalities and failing to note the possibilities that they encompass and that could be exploited. It is not enough to simply marshal good feelings and continuously invoke ethical values; it is also important to understand social change and recognize the ways in which the values one holds can be achieved under new circumstances.

The left's primary difficulty in positioning itself as a promising alternative comes from its "heroism in the face of the market" (Grunberg and Laldi 2007, 9) that prevents it from understanding the market's true nature and causes it to view the marketplace as nothing more than a fomenter of inequality, an antisocial reality. For much of the left, economic reasoning is a type of social conspiracy. They believe that social benefits are always in conflict with economic considerations. The ritual condemnation of neoliberalism and global commercialization stems from an intellectual tradition [END PAGE 116] that sets social interests against economic interests and tends to privilege determinism and existing structures over the opportunities offered by social change. From this starting point, it is difficult to comprehend that competition, rather than public or private monopolies, is one of the left's true values, especially when government monopolies have stopped guaranteeing the provision of a common good in economically efficient and socially advantageous terms.

Indeed, some government monopolies falsify the rules of the game. At this point, we are perfectly aware that both the marketplace and the government produce certain inequalities, but government inequalities are met with extraordinary indulgence by many. There are times, for example, when we must balance the value of guaranteeing employment at any cost with the price this protection represents for the people who are thus prevented from entering the workforce. This creates a new inequality. Masked as a defense of social progress, critiques of contemporary society can in fact be conservative and inequitable, which explains why the left is currently closely identified with maintaining the status quo.

This conservative attitude could be redefined in terms of political innovation, modifying procedures in order to achieve the same objectives: it is a question of putting the marketplace at the service of the public good and the fight against inequalities. Nostalgia paralyzes and does not help us understand the new terms under which an old battle is being waged. It is not accurate that an era of solidarity has been supplanted by a burst of individualism, yet we must learn to express solidarity more formally. If we want to address social problems more effectively, we must replace the mechanical tendency to automatically intensify state interventions with more flexible forms of collaboration between the government and the market-place, making use of indirect forms of government and promoting a culture that encourages the evaluation of public policies.

The other reason the left currently projects a pessimistic attitude is its wholly negative assessment of globalization. This worldview prevents it from understanding the positive effects globalization can have on the redistribution of wealth, the emergence of new actors, or the change in the rules of the game in power relationships. When it insists on deregulations related to globalization, the left runs the risk of appearing to protect the privileged few while rejecting everyone else's possibilities for development. It is true that the forces at work in the world have never been so powerful [END PAGE 117] but also so promising for so many people. Or are we meant to believe that there is not a hopeful correspondence between the process of globalization and the emergence of a multipolar world?

For that reason, the left of the twenty-first century must be careful to distinguish itself from alter-globalization. This does not mean that there are no serious problems in need of solution or that the left should abandon its critical stance. But it must not yield to the litany of protests over our loss of influence on the general course of the world. Instead of proclaiming that "another world is possible," it would better serve the left to imagine other ways of conceiving of and acting in this world. The idea that nothing can be done in the face of globalization is an excuse for political laziness. What the left cannot do is choose to act as if nothing had changed. The left will not be free from the grip of pessimism until it makes an effort to take advantage of the possibilities generated by globalization and tries to guide social change in a more just and egalitarian direction.

#### There is no totalizing theory of racial cap.

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It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups.

There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions.

Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves.

Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions.

Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.)

Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them.

Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances.

The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices.

Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions.

Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers.

Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them.

A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress -- our progress -- would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better."

The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course, this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### Affect isn’t a basis for politics.

Richard Sherwin 15. New York Law School. “Too Late for Thinking: The Curious Quest for Emancipatory Potential in Meaningless Affect and Some Jurisprudential Implications.” *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 13: 1-13.

In the history of western culture we can point to three historic moments of epistemological de-centering. The Copernican revolution taught humanity that we do not dwell at the center of the universe. The Freudian revolution taught us that the ‘‘I’’ is a lonely island besieged on all sides by a raging sea of irrational, unconscious forces. Then quantum theory taught us that the universe is indeterminate: subject to uncanny chance operations. Affect theory, perhaps as an extension of the Darwinian evolutionary account of selective adaptation, humbles rationalist pretensions further by subordinating mind to material, bio-chemical processes. If thinking is always an after-thought, an after-the-fact construction, then we can never reliably account for how we’ve actually been affected by things and others in the world around us.

How oppressive never to escape the grip of contingent social constructs. How depressing, if endless deconstruction yields only more fragmentation. Surely something must abide, some Higgs Boson-like elementary particle that can withstand deconstruction’s powerful blows. Is there anything real enough to withstand critique? Is there any basis left to hope for emancipation from the destabilizing mutability of human fabrication? In Brian Massumi’s view, there is. As he puts it: “The world always already offers degrees of freedom ready for amplification.”22 This takes us to the heart of the vitalist/ liberation impulse, namely: “escape from crystallized power structures.”23

In Massumi’s writings, affect operates as a cipher – a black box into which he can pack his emancipatory ideal.24 (“‘Affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope.’”25) What Massumi does not and perhaps cannot, or simply does not care to do is formulate a coherent basis for political judgment. While he at some points expresses a preference for “caring” and “belonging,”26 he offers no basis in affect theory for why those forms of behavior are preferable to other perhaps more intense alternatives, such as “anger” and “shock,” which he also embraces.27 But choices must be made. As Martha Nussbaum has noted, a society that cultivates conditions of anger and disgust, for example, is different from one that promotes empathy, dignity, and love.28

Massumi is enamored of the anti-structural,29 the spontaneous emergent process that Deleuze called “pure immanence.” But with affective intensity as his ultimate value30 Massumi remains trapped in a double bind. No critical judgment is forthcoming so long as intensity may be amplified.31 Because of this Massumi cannot coherently critique manifestly oppressive political structures (such as futurism, Nazism, and other intensity-fueled political regimes). How could he if the masses have opted to embrace such regimes for the intensity they provide?

Massumi’s resistance to making judgments is consistent with his theory, which minimizes to the vanishing point the human capacity for choice. For Massumi, the very notions of ‘‘individual will’’ and ‘‘subjective reflection’’ are a fiction. (“There is no individual outside its own trans-individual becoming.”32) Body is always conditioning mind – presumably without our conscious awareness. In the end, “events decide.”33 What could human freedom mean under such conditions?

The upshot is plain: in Massumi’s politics of affect, human freedom loses its capacity to signify. Choices are a fiction, and in any event no apparent normative basis exists for affirming, much less institutionalizing a preferred set of power structures. Affective intensity lacks structure by definition. Indeed, that is its appeal. (“Intensity is a value in itself.”34) But as Anthony Kronman has eloquently argued, without coherent structures, the legal, political, and cultural conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of freedom (including political judgment) are unlikely to emerge – and if they do, they are unlikely to be sustainable.35 The latter point is borne out by the very political events that Massumi identifies as exemplary of his theory. If the “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy Movement”36 illustrate anything it is the effervescence of political action based on spontaneous intensity. In the absence of adequate political structures, this kind of political action is destined to pass with the next day’s tide.

The emancipatory cri du coeur that can be heard echoing in the work of cultural theorists like Massumi may have landed on “trans-individual” affect as the intensive Higgs Boson wave-particle of political science. Its indeconstructability promises freedom from subjective and cultural contingency – the prison house of “crystallized power structures.” But there is a price to be paid. The radical devaluation of reflective consciousness produces a species of freedom that signifies nothing. Perhaps this is what it is like to embrace a Zeitgeist of “de-humanism.”37

In Massumi’s politics of affect we can discern the impetus for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ ideology. As Ben Anderson writes: “There is always already an excess [affect] that power must work to recuperate but is destined and doomed to miss. It is that excess that is central to the creativity of bio-political production and thus the power of naked life.”38 Affect in this sense is “a movement of creative production” that always eludes capture. And this is what conveys a sense of its emancipatory power.39 The intensity of affect liberates us from bondage to contingent cultural entanglement.

Corporeal ontology precedes cultural epistemology. This move away from the centrality of cognition marks the demise not only of identity politics, but of identity itself, perhaps even of psychology.40 Simply stated, affect theorists like Massumi romanticize the unknowable “fluid materiality of excitable networks” as a way of disrupting familiar social and cultural hierarchies.41 In so doing, they elevate raw process over social and cultural regimentation and subjugation. It is the neurobiological equivalent of Rousseau’s primitive origin of society, an updated version of the Romantics’ myth of enchantment. If only questions about freedom and responsibility for shared values, justice included, could be resolved by so simple an expedient as the vitalist/liberation category shift from human agency to ‘‘trans-individual affective process.’’ Much can be learned about the various forms of political violence that affective intensity has assumed over the course of human history. But one needn’t take the historical path to discern trouble for Massumi’s emancipatory project. One can start with neuroscience itself.42

Theorists like Massumi play down (as they must) a variety of obstacles that stand in the way of affective emancipation: from the constraints of evolution to the biological programming of the amygdala itself.43 Indeed, what constitutes ‘‘fearfulness,’’ for example, depends upon programming the amygdala based on a habituated pattern of external stimuli.44

There are other problems as well. For instance, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the question of how communication occurs among different levels of the mind/body complex. As Steve Pile writes, for theorists like Massumi “affect is defined in opposition to cognition, reflexivity, consciousness and humanness.”45 Feelings, on the other hand, occupy a space between non-cognitive affect and highly socialized emotions. Feelings in this sense are pre-cognitive (“a response to transpersonal affects”).46 Our response to affects personalizes them. Through feelings we associate affects with the subject who experiences them. For their part, emotions reflect a shift from pre-cognitive subjectivity to the cognitive domain of socially constructed experience.47 Emotions, in this sense, are how I interpret what I’m feeling through language and other representational or cultural symbolic practices.

Affect theorists like Massumi insist that my choices and perhaps even my feelings may turn out to have nothing to do with the affect my body has already processed without my knowing it. This view preserves the purity of affective intensity by keeping it free of subjective or social significance. If you are in the ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ camp of affect theory along with Massumi, affect can never be symbolized, which means it can never be cognized. Affect, in this view, is always beyond consciousness. It’s like the dark matter that makes up the universe: we know it’s there, we just can’t say anything about it.

The problem for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ theorists like Massumi is that they want to eat their cake and have it too. Affects for them are ciphers – free-ranging radicals incapable of signifying. Yet, at the same time, many of these same theorists engage in searing critiques of those “in power” who use mass media along with other instrumentalities of affective manipulation for purposes of enhancing social or political control.48 The difficulty is this: If affect is being actively engineered to manipulate people’s behavior – whether in the form of habits of consumption, political judgments, or jury verdicts – it is incumbent upon the theorists to account for how exactly this manipulation is being carried out. As Pile cogently notes, how are the agents of affective manipulation able to “know the unknowable” sufficiently well to control their course and impact in society?49

Thrift’s recourse to metaphors such as “pipes and cables” is hardly sufficient to bear the burden of scientific explanation. Indeed, the nomenclature that has emerged to account for the engineering of affect – ranging from “affect flow between bodies,” “transmissions,” and “contagion”50 – all seem to suffer from the same fundamental lack of explanatory power. If we cannot know what affects are, it stands to reason that we cannot know how to control their flow and impact in society.

#### “Taking up arms against white supremacy” breaks down solidarity of supporters, ensures international condemnation, and collapses the insurgency.

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Strategic nonviolent resistance can be distinguished from principled nonviolence, which is grounded in religious and ethically based injunctions against violence. Although many people who are committed to principled nonviolence have engaged in nonviolent resistance (e.g., Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.), the vast majority of participants in nonviolent struggles have not been devoted to principled nonviolence.11 The **conflation** of nonviolent struggle with principled nonviolence, pacifism, passivity, weakness, or isolated street protests has contributed to **misconceptions** about this phenomenon.12 Although nonviolent resistors eschew the threat or use of violence, the “peaceful” designation often given to nonviolent movements **belies the often highly disruptive nature of organized nonviolent resistance**. Nonviolent resistance achieves demands **against the will of the opponent by seizing control of the conflict through widespread noncooperation and defiance**.13 Violent coercion threatens physical violence against the opponent.14 Scholars often **assume** that violent methods of resistance are the most coercive or the most likely to force accommodation, thereby producing desired policy changes.15 For instance, some have argued that terrorism is an effective strategy, particularly in forcing democratic regimes to make territorial concessions.16 In contrast, Max Abrahms has shown that terrorists’ success rates are extremely low, accomplishing their policy objectives **only 7 percent of the time**.17 Abrahms nevertheless concludes that actors choose terrorism because it is still more effective than nonviolent resistance.18 We argue that nonviolent resistance may have a **strategic advantage over violent resistance** for two reasons. **First**, repressing nonviolent campaigns may **backfire**. In backfire, an unjust act—often violent repression—recoils against its originators, often resulting in the **breakdown of obedience among regime supporters**, **mobilization** of the population against the regime, and **international condemnation** of the regime.19 The internal and external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns are thus higher than the costs of repressing violent campaigns. Backfire leads to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign, creating **dissent and conflicts among the opponent’s supporters**, increasing **external support** for the resistance campaign, and **decreasing external support** for the opponent. These dynamics are **more likely to occur** when an opponent’s violence is not met with violent counterreprisals by the resistance campaign and when this is communicated to internal and external audiences.20 The domestic and international repercussions of a violent crackdown against civilians who have publicized their commitment to nonviolent action are **more severe** than repression against those who could be **credibly labeled as “terrorists” or “violent insurgents.”**21 Internally, members of a regime—including civil servants, security forces, and members of the judiciary—are more likely to shift loyalty toward nonviolent opposition groups than toward violent opposition groups. The coercive power of any resistance campaign is enhanced by its tendency to prompt disobedience and defections by members of the opponent’s security forces, who are more likely to consider the negative political and personal consequences of using repressive violence against unarmed demonstrators than against armed insurgents.22 Divisions are more likely to result among erstwhile regime supporters, who are **not as prepared** to deal with mass civil resistance as they are with armed insurgents.23 Regime repression can also **backfire** through increased public mobilization. Actively involving a relatively larger number of people in the nonviolent campaign may bring **greater** and **more sustained pressure to bear** on the target, whereas the public may **eschew violent insurgencies** because of physical or moral barriers. Externally, the international community is **more likely to denounce and sanction** states for repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns. When nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sympathize with the cause, nonviolent campaigns are more appealing as aid recipients. External aid may or may not advance the cause of the campaign.24 The external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns can be high, however, especially when the repression is captured by the media. External actors may organize sanctions against repressive regimes that repeatedly crack down on unarmed protestors.25 Although sanctions are possible in the case of violent insurgencies as well, they are less likely. Instead, some foreign states may actually aid a regime in crushing the violent insurgents. Other foreign states may lend material support to a violent resistance campaign in an attempt to advantage it against its opponent. Indeed, state sponsorship of violent insurgencies and terrorist groups has been an ongoing foreign policy dilemma for decades.26 Whether state-sponsored violent groups have succeeded in obtaining their strategic goals is unclear.

#### Violent protest worsens state human rights abuses – the broader public will rally around the government.

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Under what conditions are individuals more likely to approve of human rights abuses by their governments? One of the core responsibilities often mandated to governments, particularly in democracies, is guaranteeing basic rights and freedoms. Public support for abuses, especially violent forms like torture, therefore presents a puzzle. A common assumption is that individuals generally value human rights, despite differences in their precise content and contours (Donnelly 2003, 43–45, 89–92). Yet numerous historical and contemporary accounts reveal individuals (sometimes reluctantly, other times enthusiastically) supporting abuses (Rejali 2007, 22–23). Examining when publics are willing to reject or approve of repression can therefore provide a crucial understanding of the microfoundations for the circumstances under which mass opinion serves as a constraint, or an enabler, of human rights abuses.

Macrolevel theory suggests that both conflict characteristics and legal institutions can affect support for human rights abuses. Public opinion depends in part on the tactics adopted by the targets of such abuses and the type of repressive tactics used by governments (DeMeritt 2016). International human rights treaties prohibiting many repressive tactics can shape individuals’ perceptions of abuses (Conrad and Ritter 2019; Sikkink 2011; Simmons 2009). These claims ultimately rely on assumptions about public opinion that have not been directly tested at the micro level. While some important insights have been gained about public support for violence (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Piazza 2015), there has been little systematic study comparing the public opinion effects of alternative forms of repression and dissent. Likewise, existing work generally shows that knowledge of international law reduces public support for abuses (Chilton 2014, 2015; Chilton and Versteeg 2016; Wallace 2013), but it has not analyzed this within the context of dissent and repression.

We seek to further our understanding of the conditions under which publics approve or disapprove of human rights abuses by conducting a series of survey experiments. Our experimental design allows us to test the effects on public approval of human rights abuses with respect to three competing factors—(1) differing opposition tactics, (2) differing forms of government repression, and (3) information about international law—both in general and taking into account possible interactions among these factors. Recent survey experiments about the effects of international institutions have been conducted mostly in the United States, which does not allow us to understand whether the findings are unique to the U.S. context. Societies have vastly different histories of state repression and differing experiences with international institutions. We therefore adopt a multicountry approach, fielding our survey in three different countries—India, Israel, and Argentina—allowing us to investigate whether the factors affecting public attitudes toward repression vary depending on the particular national context.

In all three countries, we find that individuals are more likely to approve of human rights abuses when such abuses are conducted in response to a violent opposition movement. This implies that governments have greater leeway when responding to violent movements in terms of reactions by their publics. Inversely, this relationship also implies nonviolent opposition groups gain an advantage in the sense that governments may be relatively more limited in their choices when responding to such movements. While existing theory and macrolevel data support these results (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), our findings provide novel microlevel support of this phenomenon that we replicate in three countries.1

## 2NC

### T USFG---2NC

#### Their evidence gives two examples of legal prohibitions.

Cambridge, 21 (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prohibition)

Prohibition: the act of officially not allowing something, or an order that does this: New York City has announced a prohibition on smoking on buses./ The environmental group is demanding a complete prohibition against the hunting of whales.

#### Here are examples – aff changes none of them – “ending white supremacy” does not end any anticompetitive practice.

Gibbs ‘ND [Gibbs Law Group; “Anticompetitive Practices”; https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/unlawful-practices/; AS]

Federal and state antitrust laws prohibit anticompetitive behavior and unfair business practices that harm other businesses and consumers.

Examples of these unlawful, anticompetitive practices include:

Price Fixing – an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or services are sold.

Pay-for-Delay – an agreement between a brand drug manufacturer and a would-be generic competitor to delay the release of a generic version of the branded drug, depriving consumers of lower-priced generics.

Bid-Rigging – competitors agree in advance who will submit the winning bid during a competitive bidding process. As with price fixing, it is not necessary that all bidders participate in the conspiracy.

Monopolization – one or more persons or companies totally dominates an economic market.

Unfair Competition – an attempt to gain unfair competitive advantage through false, fraudulent, or unethical commercial conduct.

Market Division – an agreement between competitors not to compete within each other’s geographic territories.

Group Boycotts – two or more competitors agree not to do business with a specific person or company.

Exclusive Dealing Arrangements – an agreement that a buyer will only buy exclusively from the supplier.

Price Discrimination – charging different prices to similarly situated buyers. Certain types of price discrimination may be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act.

Tying – when a company makes the purchase of an item conditioned on buying a second item.

#### 2. Deploying militant methods results in a massive crackdown utilizing all national security assets.

**Flaherty 5** [USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand, 2005, <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html>]

In order to understand the national security implications of militant electronic piracy, an examination of conventional insurgency against the American Corporate State is necessary.

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail **and will only serve to enhance the state's power**. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, **Black Panthers,** Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could **ever** hope to attain.4 **This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.**  - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are **unimaginable** to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have **no idea** of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, **all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement.** Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

## 1NR

### Surrender to Blackness PIC---2NC

#### Surrender is a call for completeness, which link turns the 1AC’s arguments about attending to contradictions in the Black Radical Tradition.

Brady and Murillo 14 [Nicholas and John, “Black Imperative: A Forum on Solidarity in the Age of Coalition,” January 26, 2014, http://outofnowhereblog.wordpress.com/2014/01/26/black-imperative-a-forum-on-solidarity-in-the-age-of-coalition/]

“Surrender to blackness.” A grammatical imperative. Grammatical because syntactically it marks a command to or demand of a generalized addressee: “(Everyone) surrender to blackness.” Grammatical because the black flesh scarred and tattooed by these illegible hieroglyphics enunciates at the level of symbolic and ontological world orders: “Surrender to blackness” is a command at the level of the foundations of thought and being themselves; grammatical. Imperative because if there is any hope for a revolutionary praxis along any lines—race, class, gender, sexuality, (dis)ability—it must centralize, which is to say look in the face of, which is to say begin to the work of real love for, the blackness [preposition] which “an authentic upheaval might be born.”

#BlackPowerYellowPeril failed to recognize this imperative as legible, let alone heed and meet its command/demand. Created by Suey Park (@suey\_park), the hashtag sought to draw from and build upon the accomplishments of Black womyn activists on twitter and tumblr who have long mobilized to generate productive and revolutionary interjections into the world’s violently antiblack discourses (see, for example, #solidarityisforwhitewomen, and #blackmaleprivilege) through extended, communal commentary, usually in direct opposition to the censoring strictures of any kind of respectability politics. Discussions about and within the hashtag can be found here, here, here, here(though this is very hasty, a bit shortsighted, and still not doing much more than glancing at, as opposed to engaging blackness), and here. But broadly, the intentions of the hashtag are founded upon a belief in the possibility of solidarity/coalition politics between Blacks and Asians, seeking to challenge persistent “tensions” between the communities for the sake of a common struggle against ‘white supremacy.’

For those nonblack participants, the drive toward solidarity represents a purely innocent and unquestioned, unquestionable, desire. All critiques of Asian antiblackness are rendered as derailing the move toward solidarity, for they are to bring up the obvious – clearly we are all human, we make mistakes, but to continuously bring up the “mistakes” and never “move on” is to foreclose the possibility of solidarity. And what a wonderful thing the blacks of the conversation were foreclosing – this solidarity thing. What a wonderful thing others were offering to us and we simply would not take. And yet, the unthought question remains: have you truly earned the right to act in solidarity, to form solidarity, to even believe in solidarity? And what is this solidarity thing we all hold near and dear to our hearts? Have we ever experienced it or do we simply have images we have transformed into memories of a solidarity that never existed? I know Black people and Asian people have worked together in the past, but have we ever formed a solid whole? And who is to blame for the fact that we have never had solidarity? The hashtag implies that both “sides” play an equal part in the failure to form solidarity. In the face of this, confessing our sins to each other forms the moment where we can form emotional bonds: “see, you were as racist as I, and how unfortunate it is that we let old whitey come between us. Never again will whitey make us part.” This is the logic behind much of the Asian confessing – white supremacy duped us into being antiblack racists – and also fed into the backlash aimed at blacks – “stop playing oppression olympics, that’s what whitey wants.” It must be foregrounded here that antiblackness cannot be simplified as “anti-black racism” and it is a singularity with no equivalent force – “anti-Asian” racism is not the flipside of antiblackness nor is orientalism or islamophobia. Antiblackness predates white supremacy by at least 300 years (and much more than that depending on how we trace our history) and we can understand antiblackness as the general tethering of the very concept of life to the ontological and unspeakable, unthinkable force of black death. That statement is a place to begin to define antiblackness, it is not the end for this force weaves itself in infinite variety throughout all corners of the globe, forming globe into world. This is not simply about the little racist microaggressions that people listed in their tweets, this is about a global force that the world – not simply whites – bond over and form their lives inside of and through.

#### Demands for specific performances of surrender are not proof of safety. Treating a performance, such as surrendering, as inherently worthy of endorsement merely makes new forms of oppression that much harder to detect.

Berthold BRECHT 67, German poet, playwright [“Against Georg Lukacs” in *Aesthetics and Politics* [1977]Trans. Ed. Ronald Taylor p.81-83]

Now we come to the concept of realism. This concept, too, must first be cleansed before use, for it is an old concept, much used by many people and for many ends. This is necessary because the people can only take over their cultural heritage by an act of expropriation. Literary works cannot be taken over like factories: literary forms of expression cannot be taken over like patents. Even the realistic mode of writing, of which literature provides many very different examples, bears the stamp of the way it was employed, when and by which class, down to its smallest details. With the people struggling and changing reality before our eyes we must not cling to ‘tried’ rules of narrative, venerable literary models, eternal aesthetic laws. We must not derive realism as such from particular existing works, but we shall use every means, old and new, tired and untried, derived from art and derived from other sources to render reality to men in a form they can master. We shall take care not to describe one particular, historical form of novel of a particular, epoch as realistic—say that of Balzac or Tolstoy—and thereby erect merely formal, literary criteria for realism. We shall not speak of a realistic manner of writing only when, for example, we can smell, taste and feel everything, when there is ‘atmosphere’ and when plots are so contrived that they lead to psychological analysis of character. Our concept of realism must be wide and political, sovereign over all conventions.

Realistic means: discovering the causal complexes of society / unmasking the prevailing view of things as the view of those who are in power / writing from the standpoint of the class which offers the broadest solutions for the pressing difficulties in which human society is caught up / emphasizing the element of development / making possible the concrete, and making possible abstraction from it.

These are vast precepts and they can be extended. Moreover we shall allow the artist to employ his fantasy, his originality, his humour, his invention in following them. We shall not stick to too detailed literary models; we shall not bind the artist to too rigidly defined modes of narrative.

We shall establish that the so-called sensuous mode of writing—where one can smell, taste and feel everything—is not automatically to be identified with a realistic mode of writing; we shall acknowledge that there are works which are sensuously written and which are not realistic and realistic works which are not written in a sensuous style. We shall have to examine carefully the question whether we really develop a plot best when our ultimate objective is to reveal the spiritual life of the characters. Our readers will perhaps find that they have not been given the key to the meaning of events if, led astray by various artistic devices, they experience only the spiritual agitation of the heroes. By adopting the forms of Balzac and Tolstoy without testing them thoroughly, we might weary our readers—the people—as much as these writers often do themselves. Realism is not a mere question of form. Were we to copy the style of these realists, we would no longer be realists.

For time flows on, and if it did not, it would be a bad prospect for those who do not sit at golden tables. Methods become exhausted; stimuli no longer work. New problems appear and demand new methods. Reality changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must also change. Nothing comes from nothing; the new comes from the old, but that is why it is new.

The oppressors do not work in the same way in every epoch. They cannot be defined in the same fashion at all times. There are so many means for them to avoid being spotted. They call their military roads motorways; their tanks are painted so that they look like MacDuff’s woods. Their agents show blitsters on their hands, as if they were workers. No: to turn the hunter into the quarry is something that demands invention. What was popular yesterday is not today, for the people today are not what they were yesterday.

#### Discourse of “surrender” is jurispathic – war metaphors preclude “intimacies of entangled relationality” in favor of carceral condemnation

Foucault & Rabinow 84 [Michel Foucault, Co-Founder of the Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons. “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations: An interview” conducted by Paul Rabinow in May 1984. In “Essential Works of Foucault Vol. 1.” The New Press, 1998. <https://foucault.info/documents/foucault.interview/> //shree]. Gendered language modified in [brackets]

In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game — a game that is at once pleasant and difﬁcult — in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.

The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he [they] confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him [them], then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his ﬁnal objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difﬁcult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he [they] has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his [their] adversary is by deﬁnition denied.

Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic ﬁgure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it ﬁnds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn’t dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics deﬁnes alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against which one must ﬁght until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theater. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects. Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights that they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the afﬁrmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one’s killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to the truth by such paths and thus to validate, even if in a merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn’t even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debate in the USSR over linguistics or genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all — they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.

#### Our deployment of bio-d as an existential threat is good.

Tim Stevens 18. Senior Lecturer in Global Security at Kings College London. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz”. 2018. pp. 283-302.

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognized, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.

68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival.

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Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.

74 Productive pessimism and temporality

In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote:

For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.

Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.

This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterized by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.

80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalizes and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.

#### Framing bio-d loss and environmental damage is key to issue salience and generating solutions.

Robert BRULLE, Sociology & Envt’l Science @ Drexel, 10 [“From Environmental Campaigns to Advancing the Public Dialog: Environmental Communication for Civic Engagement” *Environmental Communication* 4 (1) p. 92]

From Identity to Challenge Campaigns One of the most common assumptions in designing identity-based environmental communication campaigns is that fear appeals are counterproductive. As Swim et al. (2009, p. 80) note: ‘‘well meaning attempts to create urgency about climate change by appealing to fear of disasters or health risks frequently lead to the exact opposite of the desired response: denial, paralysis, apathy, or actions that can create greater risks than the one being mitigated.’’ While the author goes on to qualify and expand this line of argument, this has been taken as an absolute in the popular press and much of the grey literature produced by nonprofit organizations and foundations. However, the academic literature portrays a much more complex picture: whereas apocalyptic rhetoric has been shown to be able to evoke powerful feelings of issue salience (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 373), reassuring messages, such as those advocated by ecoAmerica, have the least ability to increase issue salience (de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2007; Lowe et al., 2006; Meijinders, Cees, Midden, & Wilke, 2001; Witte & Allen, 2000). Additionally, apocalyptic messages do not necessarily result in denial. A number of empirical studies show that individuals respond to threat appeals with an increased focus on collective action (Eagly & Kulesa, 1997; Langford, 2002; Leiserowitz, Kates, & Parris, 2006, p. 437; Maiteny, 2002; Shaiko, 1999; Swim et al., 2009, p. 94). Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, and Leitten (1993, p. 248) distinguish between threat and challenge messaging: threat messages ‘‘are those in which the perception of danger exceeds the perception of abilities or resources to cope with the stressor. Challenge appraisals, in contrast, are those in which the perception of danger does not exceed the perception of resources or abilities to cope.’’ If a meaningful response to a threat can be taken that is within the resources of the individual, this results in a challenge, which ‘‘may galvanize creative ideas and actions in ways that transform and strengthen the resilience and creativity of individuals and communities’’ (Fritze, Blashki, Burke, & Wieseman, 2008, p. 12). While fear appeals can lead to maladaptive behaviors, fear combined with information about effective actions can also be strongly motivating (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 376; Witte & Allen, 2000).

#### Extinction outweighs---evaluate impacts through a util framing.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### 2. Deploying militant methods results in a massive crackdown utilizing all national security assets.

**Flaherty 5** [USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand, 2005, <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html>]

In order to understand the national security implications of militant electronic piracy, an examination of conventional insurgency against the American Corporate State is necessary.

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail **and will only serve to enhance the state's power**. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, **Black Panthers,** Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could **ever** hope to attain.4 **This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.**

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- Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are **unimaginable** to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have **no idea** of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, **all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement.** Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.